ISO 27001:2022 · Technological controls
ISO 27001:2022 8.15: Logging
ISO 27001:2022 8.15 covers Logging. The held text names 5 evidence records for it, the first being Statement of Applicability entry for control A.8.15, showing inclusion or justified exclusion, implementation status and the risks it.... The common gap an assessor flags is Critical systems or cloud services are not sending logs to central collection.
Logs recording activity, exceptions, faults and other events of interest are to be generated, kept, protected and analysed. Purpose (stated in ISO/IEC 27002:2022): records events, generates evidence, protects log integrity, identifies security events and supports investigations. As an Annex A reference control, it is compared with the controls determined in risk treatment (6.1.3 c) and recorded in the Statement of Applicability as included or excluded, with the justification and implementation status (6.1.3 d); implementation guidance is ISO/IEC 27002:2022 8.15.
What evidence supports 8.15?
- Annex A technological controlStatement of Applicability entry for control A.8.15, showing inclusion or justified exclusion, implementation status and the risks it treats
- Annex A technological controlThe topic-specific logging policy defining purposes, events to be logged, fields captured, retention and protection
- Annex A technological controlLog source inventory showing which systems send which event types to central logging or SIEM
- Annex A technological controlConfiguration evidence that logs are tamper-protected (append-only storage, hashing, restricted deletion) and that administrators cannot erase their own activity
- Annex A technological controlSIEM correlation rules, use cases and alert tuning records, and evidence of regular log review
Where this requirement comes from
This is our own statement of ISO 27001:2022 8.15, read from the copy we hold (licensed complete copy) and stated in our words, not the standard verbatim. The framework as we hold it.
Common gaps an assessor flags
- Critical systems or cloud services are not sending logs to central collection
- Administrators can delete or disable logging on systems they manage
- Logs overwrite themselves when storage fills, losing evidence
- Logs are collected but nobody analyses them until after an incident
How it maps to SOC 2
- CC7.2 high Logging supplies the records anomaly monitoring depends on.
A link is a topical overlap with a confidence and a reason. It does not establish that meeting one requirement satisfies the other, and it is not certification.